Ben Wheatley joins a very select crew of superb historians who have turned the received wisdom on its head. He has transformed what we thought we knew about history's greatest tank battle. This is a fearless commitment to scholarship, to analysing the evidence wherever it may lead. Pinkus, Oscar (2005). The War Aims and Strategies of Adolf Hitler. Jefferson, N.C: McFarland. ISBN 978-0-7864-2054-4. Zamulin, Valeriy (2012). "Prokhorovka: The Origins and Evolution of a Myth". The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. 25 (4): 582–595. doi: 10.1080/13518046.2012.730391. S2CID 144132258. The foundation of the myth of Prokhorovka was the need of the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant-General Pavel Rotmistrov, to explain the heavy losses suffered by the army under his command to Stalin, who was not well-known for a tolerant attitude to bad news. a b The 2nd Guards Tank Corps was initially not part of the 5th Guards Tank Army. It was transferred from the control of the 1st Tank Army to the 69th Army on 10 July, and then to the 5th Guards Tank Army on 11 July ( Glantz & House 2004, p.318).

The Panzers of Prokhorovka - Bloomsbury Publishing The Panzers of Prokhorovka - Bloomsbury Publishing

The Red Army went on a general offensive by conducting Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev on the southern side and continuing Operation Kutuzov on the northern side. The Soviet Union thus seized the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front, which it held for the rest of the war. David Glantz, When Titans Clashed: how the Red Army stopped Hitler – the initial period of war on the Eastern Front (1995). The posture, dispositions and tactics on 12 July led to few losses on either side in air combat. The 8th Air Corps reported 19 aircraft damaged and destroyed. Only one German aircraft was reported lost in combat with Soviet fighters; the rest were victims of Soviet ground-fire. In return, the 2nd Air Army reported 14 fighters damaged and destroyed (German fighter pilots claimed only seven; though they claimed 16 aircraft of all types shot down). Soviet bomber losses are unknown. [6] Result of the engagement [ edit ] German troops during a lull in the fighting during Operation Citadel on the southern side of the Kursk salientGlantz, David M.; House, Jonathan M. (1999). The Battle of Kursk. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-0-7006-0978-9.

Battle of Prokhorovka Was the Largest Tank Battle of All The Battle of Prokhorovka Was the Largest Tank Battle of All

The German offensive plan envisioned an assault at the base of the Kursk salient from both the north and south, with the intent of enveloping and destroying the Soviet forces in the salient. [12] [13] The two spearheads were to meet near the city of Kursk. From the south, the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps and General Paul Hausser's II SS-Panzer Corps, forming the left and right wings of the 4th Panzer Army commanded by Colonel General Hermann Hoth, would drive northward. The III Panzer Corps of Army Detachment Kempf was to protect Hoth's right flank. The 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf were under Army Group South, commanded by von Manstein. Air support over the southern portion of the offensive was provided by Colonel General Otto Deßloch's Luftflotte 4 and its major air formation, the 8th Air Corps. [14] [15] The German offensive, originally slated to commence in the beginning of May, was postponed several times as the German leadership reconsidered and vacillated over its prospects, as well as to bring forward more units and equipment. [16] [17] The seven German tanks stood no chance. Four were hit. Ribbentrop’s and two others got away, covered by clouds of dust, which made it difficult to tell a T-34 from a panzer. Wave after wave of T-34s, the greater part of the Soviet 25th Tanks Corps, now came down the hill, forming, in Ribbentrop’s words, ‘an unimaginable mass of armour approaching at top speed.’ All seemed lost for the panzer companies below.German domination of the Prokhorovka air space occurred for several reasons. During the initial stages of the battle it was Soviet tanks that were hit and burned, obscuring the battlefield which made it difficult for Soviet commanders to develop a clear picture of the situation. Added to that was the failure to provide air liaison officers with Red Army forces, who were then unable to call for air support when the German assault formations first appeared. Whereas the German 8th Air Corps assembled powerful concentrations over the Prokhorovka battlefield, the 17th Air Army spread its forces thinly, to support other sectors; the Soviets dominated the air over the 4th Panzer Army's flanks, leaving the skies over Prokhorovka clear. The 2nd Air Army's fighter aviation had been reduced to 266 aircraft, and this force was used in the fighter escort, not the air superiority role. [6] The battle of Prokhorovka absorbed the 8th Air Corps' combat power to the extent it was unable to intervene to support the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, enabling Soviet defences to defeat the attempted breakthrough in that sector. [6] A defining characteristic of most battles is confusion, with even commanders uncertain of the progress of their forces. This was particularly true of Prokhorovka, where a clash between two great tank armies took place in a confined space close to a rail junction and the River Psel – one which few tank commanders would have chosen – and with the fighting enveloped in clouds of dust. The present academic consensus has it that the cream of Hitler’s armoured formations, the thuggish paramilitary SS Panzer Divisions, were smashed in this battle, losing hundreds of tanks, and never recovering their former capabilities. In reality, diligent archival research reveals that only 16 tanks from the SS formations were lost. In fact, by the end of the Kursk fighting, these units had more tanks than they started with. Glantz, David M.; House, Jonathan (1995). When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-0-7006-0899-7.

The Panzers of Prokhorovka: The myth of Hitler’s greatest

Glantz, David M.; House, Jonathan M. (2004) [1999]. The Battle of Kursk. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-0-7006-1335-9. Today in Russia there are three official sacred battlefields: Kulikovo, where the Mongols were defeated in 1380; Borodino, where Russian troops slowed Napoleon's Grande Armée before Moscow in 1812; the third is Prokhorovka. This is widely described as the most critical tank battle of the Second World War, which saw the annihilation of Hitler's elite Panzer force in the largest armoured clash in history and left Hitler with no alternative but to halt Germany's offensive against the Kursk salient. Victory, on 12 July 1943, at Prokhorovka over Hitler's vaunted SS troops has traditionally been described as a turning point in the Second World War. Despite the huge number of tanks involved, Wheatley estimates the battlefront to have been no more than 3km (2 miles), so that, as he comments, ‘the location of one of the most famous battles of the Second World War was able to be photographed by the Luftwaffe in a single shot.’ September 28, 2019 Topic: History Region: Europe Blog Brand: The Buzz Tags: Nazi Germany History Russia Military Technology War Tanks World War II The Battle of Prokhorovka Was the Largest Tank Battle of All Time In that context, this is not a title for an interested amateur, or casual observer of the titanic struggles between the German and Soviet armies on the Eastern Front. Rather, it’s a very detailed, data intensive analysis of losses suffered by the SS during a specific tank battle.

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Late on 6 July, the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Armies of the Steppe Front began moving up from their reserve position. [34] The 5th Guards Tank Army covered the 320–390 kilometres (200–240mi) over three days, and arrived at the Prokhorovka area on the night of 9 July, [35] [36] and the 5th Guards Army's 33rd Guards Rifle Corps arrived at the settlement on the night of 10 July. [37] Both armies completed their journey and deployment intact without any substantial interference from the Luftwaffe. [38] If ever there was a time for a sober, authoritative dissection of the myths the Soviets fashioned from the Eastern Front, it is now.' - Oliver Moody, Berlin Correspondent for The Times The 10th Tank Corps was transferred from the control of the 5th Guards Army to the Voronezh Front on 7 July, and to the 1st Tank Army on 8 July ( Glantz & House 2004, p.324). Only its 11th Motorised Rifle Brigade was in the battlefield of Prokhorovka on 12 July ( Glantz & House 2004, pp.166, 195, 417). Glantz, David (January 1991). Soviet Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle. London; Portland, OR: Taylor & Francis (Frank Cass). ISBN 0-7146-4077-8. This is a widely accepted view, of course, but to my mind The Panzers of Prokhorovka does not provide enough context to bridge the gap between the minuscule numbers of tanks lost at a tactical level in one battle and the vast array of destruction that epitomised the wider Eastern Front.