Cadre Country: How China became the Chinese Communist Party

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Thus, the national Party body, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, will manage cadres at or above the provincial or equivalent level, and provincial Party committees will manage prefectures and prefecture-level cities, which in turn manage county-level cadres. The Provisional Regulations established the first formal civil service in China since the founding of the People's Republic. The CCP's territorial growth necessitated more members to serve as cadres, and the party accordingly relaxed somewhat its membership restrictions on intellectuals, former left-wing Kuomintang officers, and others not of a purely working peasant background. Cadre Country is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the workings of the Chinese Communist Party and the limits of its achievements. Due to the high demand for manpower, the CCP was forced to rely on former Kuomintang officials to fill many of these positions as low-level, non-party cadres, which helped alleviate the shortage by 1952.

Leading cadre status is not dependent on rank, as many high-ranking cadres may nevertheless not be in what is considered a leading position. Cadre Country places the spotlight on the nation's 40 million cadres – the managers and government officials employed by the ruling Communist Party to protect its great enterprise.Quoted in Mao (1966) Quotations from Mao Tse Tung Archived 2020-03-06 at the Wayback Machine, Chapter 29. Fitzgerald cites studies suggesting there are at least 130 million such migrant laborers (up to 10% of the population), who while working in the cities are still legally treated as part of their former rural environments.

Delicacies for a Privileged Class in a Risk Society: The Chinese Communist Party's Special Supplies Food System". Certainly leaves no doubt that the CCP (China) is totally and deeply committed to the loathsome, disgusting, pseudo social science that is Marxism and communism.

You can change your choices at any time by visiting Cookie preferences, as described in the Cookie notice. Peter Zarrow, University of Connecticut Since the founding of the Communist Party in China just over a century ago, there is much the country has achieved.

The Central Committee itself only manages an estimated 4,000 to 5,000 cadre positions directly, including figures such as the provincial governors and deputy governors, chairmen of provincial People's Congresses, and chief prosecutors in the judicial system.It could do with better editing in places (sometimes not clear on first reading whether some statements were intended to be factual, or sarcastic! It's also a very easy and quick read, a testament to the decades of careful thought and scholarship behind it. These efforts particularly focused on a strengthened ideological education of cadres to reinforce understanding of their own role in the mass line connecting the people and the CCP. The Party-State is ruled by elite families, who explicitly invoke blood ties to appoint sons and daughters to key positions as a necessary element of their rule.

Cadres under Mao were often appointed based on revolutionary fervor as opposed to technical competence, and many were uneducated.Avoiding shibboleths like totalitarian and never assuming the inevitability of the paths China has taken in the past or will take in the future, Fitzgerald gives us a much-needed clinical description of the fundamental nature of Chinese politics. Unlike contemporary cadres, cadres in the Mao era could not leave a government job to enter private business or to seek voluntary transfer to a different region or office. Organization Department branches at all levels keep a "leading cadre reserve list" ( Chinese: 领导干部候补名单; pinyin: Lǐngdǎo gànbù hòubǔ míngdān) from which capable cadres may be selected to fill leading positions as they become vacant. Not because it is 'bad' or may exploit the 'people-state', but rather because it began to undermine the loyalty and capacity of the Cadres in ensuring the survival and stability of the 'Party-State'.