The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History

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The world's foremost historian of Ukraine. . . the chronicler of a country on the front lines of a seismic European war' Financial Times This is a timely book about the first year of the Russo-Ukrainian war. It stops at about February of this year. I liked the detailed information about how the military operations went, but it was the political - diplomatic developments that were really fascinating. The author goes into depth about the effects of the war on China, Turkey, Europe, Russia and the U.S. The author is Ukrainian and makes no secret that his view point is biased. Serhii Plokhy oferă o privire cuprinzătoare asupra contextului istoric și a primelor luni ale războiului în curs de desfășurare din Ucraina. Urmărind secole de relații turbulente între Rusia și Ucraina, Plokhy susține că acest conflict a fost pregătit de zeci de ani, alimentat de ambițiile imperiale ale lui Putin și de lunga luptă a Ucrainei pentru suveranitate (și păstrarea identității sale). In 1240AD Batu Khan's Mongolian "Golden Horde" invaded the Byzantine Empire centered at Constantinople. The disruption Constantinople's ability to serve as the Kyivan Rus' protector and regional power shifted toward the Duchy of Muscovy, which would expand to incorporate much of the Kievan 'Rus territory. In short, Plohky claims that Putin's success on today's battlefield would not restore Russia to its former self; rather, it would create a new entity – a Ukraine once again subservient to the Federation of Russia.

But soon he began to change his mind. History, after all, is a weapon in this conflict. Vladimir Putin’s justification for his aggression towards Ukraine is rooted in his (twisted and faulty) understanding of the past. He even wrote a sprawling, inaccurate essay laying out his views in 2021, titled On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians. Plokhy began to feel compelled to fight the Russian president’s terrible history writing with good, solid history writing of his own. Het idee dat Oekraïne tot de Navo zou kunnen toetreden, belastte de verhoudingen van het westen met Rusland vanaf eind jaren negentig. Voor Polen, Tsjechië en Hongarije was toetreding tot de Navo een voorwaarde geweest om zich veilig te kunnen voelen tegenover Russisch revanchisme. “After decades of Soviet domination,” legde de Poolse president Lech Walesa uit, “we are all afraid of Russia.” Hij voegde eraan toe: “If Russia again adopts an aggressive foreign policy, this aggression will be directed against Ukraine and Poland.” (75) Zonder lidmaatschap, zo hadden Poolse diplomaten al in 1992 gewaarschuwd, zou Polen zich genoodzaakt zien kernwapens te bemachtigen. Ook de Oekraïense lidmaatschapsambities werden in die jaren vaak in dit licht bezien. “Some [in Washington] were prepared to offer membership to the Ukrainians as a carrot to give up their nuclear arsenal,” aldus Plokhy. (77) Met het al genoemde Boedapest-memorandum deed Oekraïne echter afstand van kernwapens zonder daarvoor harde veiligheidsgaranties terug te krijgen.Based on decades of research and his unique insight into the region, he argues that Ukraine's defiance of Russia, and the West's demonstration of unity and strength, has presented a profound challenge to Putin's Great Power ambition, and further polarized the world along a new axis. A riveting, enlightening account, this is present-minded history at its best.

To soften the blow of the “concession to their former master” and hide the embarrassing victory of Russia over the US, NATO asserted that both countries did have the right to eventually join the alliance.

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Plokhy prefers “Russo-Ukrainian war” to alternatives like “ Russia’s war against Ukraine”. While the latter expression is well suited to emphasising Russia’s culpability in this war, the former stresses that Ukraine is not just a victim of Russia, but its equal. Tegen deze achtergrond bestond er vanaf het einde van de Koude Oorlog eigenlijk voortdurend onzekerheid over de vraag of Rusland de territoriale integriteit van Oekraïne zou blijven respecteren. Al in 1992 nam het Russische parlement een resolutie aan die de Krim als onderdeel van Rusland beschouwde. Duidelijk is dat Oekraïense soevereiniteit slechts was gegarandeerd zolang het land zich schikte naar de belangen van Rusland, of zoals Plokhy schrijft: “Russia’s recognition of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the post-Soviet states would be conditional on alliance with Moscow.” (66) Onder deze omstandigheden, zo bepleitte John Mearsheimer in 1993 in Foreign Affairs, zouden de VS er goed aan doen Oekraïne toe te staan te blijven beschikken over kernwapens; volgens de Amerikaanse strateeg was dit “the most effective way to prevent a Russo-Ukrainian war [which could] ‘injure the prospects for peace throughout Europe.’” (71-2) Aber selbst wenn sich die Hoffnungen der Ukraine auf unangefochtene Souveränität nicht erfüllen, hat Russland sich entlarvt. Es wird schwierig werden, die Welt davon zu überzeugen, dass man seiner Regierung/Regime trauen kann. P.S. Vă las și un citat despre o vizită la Kiev. Sunt curioasă dacă observați ce personaj este pierdut din poveste. Și nu cred că din răutate:(

Poetins plan voor een door Rusland geleide Euraziatische Unie als een van de machtsblokken in de wereld lag in 2014 derhalve in duigen door toedoen van Oekraïne. De Russo-Oekraïense oorlog liet daarna niet lang meer op zich wachten: “Having failed to keep all of Ukraine in his orbit, Putin opted for the annexation of part of its territory to develop his Greater Russia project, meant to integrate territories with ethnic Russian majorities into the Russian Federation.” (111) In een tv-interview in april 2014 maakte Poetin duidelijk dat “Nieuw Rusland” in zijn ogen niet alleen de Krim maar ook de oblasten Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Mykolaiv en Odessa omvatte. Hij maakte gebruik van het machtsvacuüm dat in Oekraïne was ontstaan door het plotselinge vertrek van Janoekovitsj om zich dit deel van Oekraïne gewapenderhand toe te eigenen. Ook de Russische inlichtingendiensten waren belangrijke actoren in de militaire campagne van Moskou. ���The importance of Russian agents in destabilizing the Donbas and turning it into a separatist enclave is hard to overestimate,” aldus Plokhy. (125)In Plokhy’s summary, “Ukraine was divided by history, culture, and the political orientations and instincts of its people as the Russian Federation never was.” Those who imagine a modern democratic nation in 19th-century terms – as a culturally, linguistically and politically united entity – stress all these factors as sources of instability. It is a cruel game to ask a historian to look into the future. But here we are and, as Plokhy himself says, rephrasing Churchill, historians are probably “the worst commentators on contemporary events except for all the others”. So what about the Ukrainians’ spring counteroffensive, I ask – which, when we speak in the last days of April, is expected any day. Future historians will judge whether Plokhy’s vision was correct. Ukraine has not won the war yet, after all. And all kinds of nightmare scenarios, including nuclear war, might still play out.